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Non–Technical Summary
Before the 1st of January 1999 it was possible for, say, Italy to make her products
more attractive by allowing her currency to devaluate. What is more, the price of the
Italian currency could be adjusted within seconds at the world’s currency exchanges.
Today, Italy has a common currency with the other countries that adopted the euro.
If by some shock Italian exports were overpriced in relation to, say, German
products, an adjustment of the exchange rate would not be possible any more to
restore equilibrium. If prices remain rigid, factor mobility is the most important
substitute for the exchange rate as a means of adjustment between two regions in a
currency union. It is the aim of this paper to evaluate whether labour in Europe is
mobile enough to accommodate shocks to unemployment and incomes.
To this end, we estimate the migratory response with respect to changes in
unemployment and income on the basis of regional panel data provided by Eurostat,
the statistical office of the European Union. The countries investigated are Western
Germany, France, and Italy. The statistical analysis indicates that migration responds
to changes in unemployment, but the effect of income is insignificant. Simulation
results show that at a maximum 30 percent of an increase in the number of
unemployed persons are accommodated by a migratory response in Germany one
and a half years after the shock. The corresponding estimates for France and Italy are
much lower at 8 percent and 4 percent, respectively. In the case of Western
Germany, it takes at least four years until more than half of a shock to unemployment
is accommodated by migration.
As a result, labour mobility cannot act as a sufficient adjustment mechanism to
asymmetric shocks in Euroland in the short run. Policy measures to improve
European labour mobility would have to include profound changes like the
coordination of the tax and social insurance systems and the definition of a common
language. Such measures are not planned in the near future which means that labour
mobility will remain low in Europe. As a consequence, Euroland has to live with
larger and more persistent structural problems than the United States, where labour is
more mobile.
In theory this need not be a problem for the euro, as regional inequalities in Euroland
are not per se a problem for a common currency. However, if Europeans keep up
comparatively high welfare payments as well as regional policies, the euro may
increase the demand for public funds on a national, but maybe also on a European
level. The consequences of monetary union combined with deficient migration might
therefore be higher taxes.
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether labour mobility is likely to act as a
sufficient adjustment mechanism in the face of asymmetric shocks in Euroland.
To this end, we estimate the elasticity of migration with respect to changes in
unemployment and income on the basis of regional panel data provided by Eurostat,
the statistical office of the European Union. Regression results are provided for
Western Germany, France, and Italy.
It is shown that labour mobility is highest in Germany, followed by France, and Italy.
However, even in Germany, the accommodation of a shock to unemployment by
migration takes several years.
We conclude that labour mobility is extremely unlikely to act as a sufficient
adjustment mechanism to asymmetric shocks in Euroland.
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11 Introduction
Is labour mobility likely to adjust for asymmetric shocks in Euroland? This is the
central question to be addressed in this paper. Now that most countries in the
European Union have a common currency, they cannot use independent monetary
policies any more as a means of adjustment. With no more exchange rates and equal
interest rates between them, some other mechanism has to take effect when the
supply and demand of a country's goods are in imbalance.
Mundell (1961) suggests that the degree of external versus internal factor mobility is
decisive for defining optimum currency areas: he argues that flexible exchange rates
work best if the world can be divided into currency areas within which factor
mobility is very high, but between which factor mobility is very low. The lack of
factor mobility between the currency regions can then in the face of shocks be
compensated by exchange rate alignments. For European Monetary Union, Mundell's
(1961) argument means that the euro zone (Euroland) would be more optimal than the
former national currency zones, if the factors of production were more mobile within
Euroland than within nation states, given the same levels of asymmetric shocks within
the respective currency zones. Put differently: on the one hand, a high degree of
factor mobility within Euroland is required to compensate for the loss of the
exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism in the face of asymmetric shocks between
Euroland's nation states. On the other hand, tough, it is doubtful whether former
national currencies were appropriate shock absorbers given asymmetries and low
factor mobilities within European nation states.
Previous research concludes that the shocks experienced by the European Union are
more asymmetric as those in the United States or in Germany (Bayoumi and
Eichengreen, 1993; Funke, 1997), where smaller countries are especially hit by
asymmetric shocks (Buscher, 1999). Although economic integration may cause these
asymmetries in Euroland to decline, differences in tax and social security systems as
well as comparative advantage may well lead to a type of integration which creates
more asymmetries. Which effect will dominate is an empirical question for the future.
For now, it seems safe to assume that the need to adjust for asymmetric shocks is
greater in Euroland than in the United States or in the former currency areas of the
euro zone. But although there is some weak evidence that independent monetary
policies of Euroland's nation states could in the past be used to achieve more
economic convergence (Müller and Buscher, 1999a), there is also empirical evidence
for the hypothesis that the volatility of Euroland's former exchange rates had a
destabilising effect on unemployment rates (see Müller and Buscher, 1999b, and the
studies cited therein).
2Hence it is by no means clear that the loss of the exchange rate flexibility between
Euroland's former currencies is economically undesirable in itself (Franz, 1998).
Nevertheless, a high degree of factor mobility will be conducive to the well–
functioning of Europe's currency union. Müller and Heinemann (1999) show that
exchange rate volatility led to a smaller degree of capital mobility in Euroland in the
past. Therefore, the euro is likely to increase the degree of capital mobility. Another
factor likely to raise capital mobility is the fact current account targets to stabilise
national exchange rates become unnecessary for nation states within the euro zone.
This allows a higher discrepancy between savings and investments and hence higher
capital mobility than before currency union.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how far labour mobility has the potential
to act as a means of adjustment. Our empirical analysis presents estimates of
migration–induced population changes due to changes in unemployment or incomes
in Western Germany, France, and Italy. Generally, our data do not allow us to
distinguish between internal and external migration (Italy is an exception). Nor are
there data on migration between regions belonging to different European nation
states. Therefore, Mundell's (1961) criterion for an optimum currency area, namely
the comparison of internal versus external factor mobilities between the old and new
currency areas, cannot be implemented empirically. Nevertheless, the size of the
estimates from the approach taken here allows a judgement on the short–run
equilibrating potential that labour mobility might have in the investigated countries
today. It will be seen that this potential is rather low and is likely to remain so in the
near future.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises empirical studies on labour
mobility in Europe. In Section 3, the size of the migratory response to unemployment
and income differentials in Western Germany, France, and Italy is estimated on the
basis of the most recent available data from Eurostat, the statistical office of the
European Union. Our results are summarised in Section 4, where some hypotheses
on the future development of labour mobility in Europe as well as policy options are
presented.
32 Previous Work on Labour Mobility in Europe
Official European statistics do not collect data on migration between regions of
different nation states. Therefore, previous studies on labour mobility in Europe
either only give rough descriptions of international compared to intranational
migration, or compare interregional migration within specific European nation states
with interregional migration in the United States. Studies which make comparisons
between countries are summarised in Table 1 in chronological order.
The articles which present descriptive statistics of international versus intranational
migration are OECD (1986), Straubhaar (1988), De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke
(1993), and Gros (1996). The results from the observations of these statistics can be
summarised as follows: total migration as a share of total population is generally
lower in European countries than in the United States. Also, migration in Europe is
lower than in Australia, Canada, and Japan. Moreover, (im)migration flows in(to) the
European union are of the same order as or higher than interregional migration flows
in European countries. This means that labour mobility in Europe is just as driven by
immigration as it is by migration within Europe. In addition, migration within Europe
is largely migration within European nation states rather than between them.
Comparing interregional migration within different European nation states, it is shown
that in southern countries (Italy and Spain) interregional migration is less than half as
large as in northern ones (Western Germany, France, Netherlands, UK).
To sum up the prima facie evidence on migration flows in Europe, it seems rather
clear that mobility in European nation states lacks behind mobility in other nation
states. As mobility between European nation states is much lower as within them, it
is plausible to assume that labour mobility cannot be an adequate adjustment
mechanism for labour market disequilibria in Euroland. However, it may well be the
case that the cause of low mobility in Europe is the lack of economic incentives to
migrate. In this case, the conclusion that European labour mobility is too low to act
as an adjustment instrument would be wrong. What is decisive to the answer of this
question is not the total migration flows between European regions, but the elasticities
of migration with respect to economic outcomes such as wages and unemployment
rates.
The correlation between migration flows and economic variables has been
investigated by Weidlich and Haag (1988), Eichengreen (1993), Chies (1994), Barro
and Sala–i–Martin (1995), Decressin and Fatás (1995), Gros (1996), and the
European Commission (1998). The studies show that economic variables like wage
and unemployment differentials are indeed important determinants of migration flows.
As expected, high wages favour immigration, whereas high unemployment rates
4favour emigration. However, migration flows generally take years to absorb
economic shocks. Migratory responses to labour market outcomes also vary
between countries. Investigations based on regression analysis demonstrate that
workers in the United States (and Japan) are more mobile than Europeans within their
own nation states. Comparing European countries, mobility in Western Germany is
higher than in the UK, where it is higher than in Italy. In general, regional employment
shocks in Europe are mainly accommodated by short–run changes in the labour
force participation rate, whereas they trigger migration flows in the United States.
To sum up, European migratory responses to unemployment and wage differentials
between and within nation states are lower than in the United States. In general,
previous estimates suggest that it takes more than a decade for migration to adjust for
shocks to unemployment. This holds even for Western Germany, where labour
seems to be more mobile than in Italy or the UK (before 1990) (see also Büttner,
1999a, for Western Germany; Attanasio and Padoa Schioppa, 1991, for Italy;
Pissarides and McMaster, 1990, for the UK). Moreover, Decressin (1994) shows
with German data that the migratory response with respect to unemployment is
lowest when unemployment is generally high. This means that mobility is low when it
is most needed.
Unfortunately, with one exception, the studies surveyed in Table 1 do not attempt to
pin down the migratory response to unemployment or wage movements by a number
which is easy to interpret. Although Eichengreen (1993) estimates a coefficient on the
lagged unemployment rate with the immigration rate as the dependent variable, no
sample means are provided in his paper, so that a statement ‘1 percent more
unemployed people causes x percent of the population to migrate’ cannot be made
from his paper without ad hoc assumptions. The same is true for the contribution of
Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1995). Decressin and Fatás (1995), on the other hand,
estimate that in the European Union almost zero percent of a shock in labour demand
are reflected by migration one year after the shock. Two, three, and four years after
the shock, the shares are 27, 45, and 80 percent, respectively. By contrast, in the
United States 52 percent of a shock in labour demand are accommodated by
migration already in the first year after the shock.
Using a somewhat different methodology, smaller regional units, and more recent
data than Decressin and Fatás (1995), we will estimate the short–run response of
migration to changes in unemployment rates and incomes in the following section.
5Table 1: Summary of Comparative Empirical Studies
Study Countries Data Methodology Main Results
OECD (1986) Australia,
Canada, USA,
Japan,
CH, D(W),
England/Wales,
F, N, S, SF
1965–1983 panels for 8 (Australia),
12 (Canada), 51 (USA), 47 (Japan),
26 (CH), 11 (D(W)), 8
(England/Wales), 21 (France), 19
(N), 24 (S), 12 (F) regions
Comparison of interregional
migration rates within countries
over time
Interregional migration is highest in the USA,
Australia, Canada, and Japan, lowest in Europe
Over time, interregional migration has declined by
between a quarter and a third in Europe and Japan
Straubhaar (1988) EU 1958–1980 Comparison of intra–EU and extra–
EU migration flows
The share of extra–EU migration in total migration
flows rose from one third to two thirds
Weidlich and Haag
(1988)
Canada, D, F,
Israel, I, S
1961–1982 (Canada),
1960–1983 (D),
1954–1982 (F),
1965–1980 (Israel)
1965–1982
1968–1982 (S)
panels for 10 (Canada), 11 (D), 21
(F), 14 (Israel),
20 (I), 8 (S) regions
Regression of 'regional utilities' on
socio–economic variables;
'regional utilities' are obtained from
a dynamic model of interregional
migration with microeconomic
foundations
Income and (un)employment variables are key factors
explaining regional preferences
D and S are closer to equilibrium population
distribution than Canada and I
For Canada, D (I, S) the trend is towards slower
(faster) adjustment to equilibrium
Generally, adjustment is slow in relation to the
frequency of shocks
De Grauwe and
Vanhaverbeke
(1993)
D(W), E, F, I, NL,
UK
1975–1987 internal migration rates
for 11 (D(W)), 16 (E), 9 (F) regions,
11 (I), 4 (NL), and 11 (UK) regions
Comparison between countries of
internal regional migration rates
Interregional mobility in the southern (E, I) countries
is less than half as large as in the northern ones
(D(W), F, NL, UK) despite higher income differentials
in the South
Stock of the countries' immigrants
from and emigrants to the rest of
the EU in 1984
Comparison of the stock of
migrants (cumulated external
migration) with the internal
(regional) migration rate
External cumulated migration is smaller than annual
internal migration
Eichengreen (1993) GB
I
USA
1962–1985 panels for 9 (GB, USA)
and 6 (I) regions
Regression of net immigration rate
on lagged net migration rate, lagged
change in relative (to national)
wages, and lagged relative
unemployment rate
Immigration is positively related to high wages and
negatively to high unemployment rates
Migratory responses are larger in the USA than in GB
and I
Tests for cointegration between Regional and national unemployment rates are
6regional and national unempl. rates cointegrated in GB and I, but not in the USA
Table 1: Summary of Comparative Empirical Studies (ctd.)
Chies (1994) D, F,
E, GR, I, P, TK
1961–1990 time series for each
country
Regression of emigration rate from
E, GR, I, P, TK to D, F on income
and unemployment differentials
Income differentials play a role for the migration from
E and P to F, and from E and I to D
Unemployment differentials drive the migration from
GR and I to D and from I to F
Barro and Sala–i–
Martin (1995)
D, E, F, GB, I
USA
Japan
1990–1990 (USA), 1955–1990
(Europe, Japan) panels for 51 US
states, 46 Japanese prefectures, and
11 (D), 17 (E), 21 (F), 20 (I) regions
in European countries
Regression of net migration rate on
per capita income, weather
conditions, and population density
Income has a much smaller effect on migration in
Europe than in the USA or Japan
Migration plays only a minor role in the convergence
of incomes
Decressin and
Fatás (1995)
EU
USA
1975–1990 panels for 51 US states
and 51 EU regions
Regression of dynamic system of
equations with relative (to EU / US)
employment innovations,
employment rates, and participation
rates
A region–specific employment shock in the EU as
well as in EU nation states (in the USA) is in the
short–run mainly absorbed by the participation rate
(migration between regions)
Mobility is higher in Western Germany than in the
UK and Italy
Existence of natural relative unemployment rates at
the regional level in both the EU and the USA
Gros (1996) EU 1992 cross section of EU regions Comparison of immigration rates
into member states with those
between regions within member
states
The immigration rate into EU member states and
inter–regional migration are roughly of the same order
Comparison of the correlations
between interregional migration and
owner occupancy levels
Countries with higher owner occupancy levels have
lower interregional migration rates
However, the UK is an outlier with a comparatively
high interregional migration rate
European
Commission (1998)
EU
USA
EU: NUTS2 regional data
USA: 9 census regions
Comparison of the correlations
between net migration rates and
unemployment rates
The correlation between unemployment rates and
migration is greatest in I, SF, UK, USA
Notes: abbreviations: CH: Switzerland; D: Germany; D(W): Western Germany; E: Spain; EU: European Union; F: France; GB: Great Britain; GR: Greece; I: Italy;
N: Norway; NL: Netherlands; P: Portugal; S: Sweden; SF: Finland; TK: Turkey; USA: United States of America; UK: United Kingdom
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83 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we estimate the short–run impact of alterations in unemployment rates
and incomes (gross domestic product, GDP) on migration. The reason we use data
on GDP and not on wages is that complete and consistent wage series are not
available. Our model is described in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 introduces the data we
use and presents some stylised evidence on convergence of unemployment rates and
GDP in Euroland on the basis of descriptive statistics. Finally, we discuss our
estimation results in Section 3.3.
3.1 Model Specification
Our aim is to estimate the elasticity of the migration–induced population growth
factor in a region with respect to a ceteris paribus change in the number of the
unemployed or the level of income. In analogy to the Todaro migration model (see,
e.g., Todaro, 1980), we assume that migration is affected by the expected level of
income that can be obtained at home in relation to the level that can be obtained
elsewhere. Thus not only the average income of a region is decisive for its
attractiveness for migrants, but also the likelihood of finding a job in that region. This
likelihood may be proxied by the unemployment rate. We therefore assume the
following model for the migration–induced population growth factor:
mig pop
pop
A
u y
u y
it it
it
it
it it
nt nt
+
=-
-
- -
- -
1
1
1 1
1 1
1 2
1 2
a a
a a
where mig denotes net (im)migration, pop population, u  the unemployment rate, and
y income (GDP). A  is a some constant. The indices i , n , and t  describe the
individual region, the nation it belongs to, and time (in years), respectively.
Taking natural logarithms on both sides of the equation, a log–linear equation can be
derived which may be estimated:
ln ln ln ln ln .
mig pop
pop
u u y yit it
it
it nt it nt i t it
+
= + - + - + + +-
-
- - - -
1
1
0 1 1 1 2 1 1a a a m h e
where ln Ait i t it= + + +a m h e0 . To give an example of how this equation can be
interpreted, a1 is the migration elasticity with respect to the number of unemployed
persons. This is to say, if the number of unemployed persons in a region increases
by 1 percent, the population in that region will ceteris paribus increase by a1 percent
due to migration. The coefficient on income can be interpreted analogously. Note that
9separate coefficients for the country–specific variables lnunt -1 and ln ynt -1 are not
identifiable if time–specific effects are estimated for each year, as the variables lnunt -1
and ln ynt -1 only have a variation in the time–series, but not in the cross–section
dimension.
3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use regional data at the NUTS2 level from the Regio 98 databank of Eurostat, the
statistical office of the European Union (NUTS stands for nomenclature of
territorial units for statistics, see Figure 1 in the appendix). This databank contains
inter alia data on the population, births, deaths, unemployment (rates), and the gross
domestic product. Data on net migration can be retrieved for all countries as the
population change plus deaths minus births. The net migration data retrieved in this
way also includes external migration. In addition, there are data on internal migration
for some countries at the NUTS2 level.
Due to the extrapolations by which population statistics are obtained between
population censuses, we sometimes observe huge jumps in the measured migration
rate when a population census take place. Although a measurement error in the
dependent variable does not lead to biased estimation results unless the measurement
error is correlated with the exogenous variables, we decided to exclude years when
the observed migration showed unrealistic spikes. The Spanish data are excluded
from the analysis completely for that reason. Correspondence with Eurostat
confirmed that the measurement errors are particularly large for Spain.
Panels of reasonable size are only available for the larger countries of Euroland. We
thus concentrate our analysis on Western Germany, France, and Italy. Figure 2 to
Figure 5 in the appendix show the development of the migration–induced population
growth factor for these countries. Figure 2 to Figure 4 plot the migration–induced
population growth factors where migration includes external migration. The graphs
show that Western Germany experienced a huge immigration wave in the beginning
of the 1990s (cf. Velling, 1995; Zimmermann, 1995). This is due to the fall of the iron
curtain which was followed by mass immigration of Germans living in Eastern
Germany or other formerly communist states. In France, the average population
growth factor does not seem to have changed much over time. In Italy, we observe a
slight rise in the beginning of the 1990s, but the degree of the increase is not
comparable to the one shown for Western Germany.
As we also have data on internal migration at the NUTS2 level for Italy, a comparison
of total migration with only internal migration can be made from Figure 4 and
Figure 5. In the latter, the year 1990 had to left out because of large spikes for some
regions that are due to measurement errors (information from Eurostat). At first sight,
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the two figures for Italy look rather distinct. However, a closer look reveals that the
ordering of regions according to the migration–induced population growth factor is
very similar in both data sources.
Summary statistics for the data panels of both the dependent and the independent
variables in our model are provided in Table 4 to Table 7 in the appendix. Comparing
the average population size of the regions between the countries (about in the middle
of each table), it is found that Western Germany has – on average –smaller regions
(population around 2 million persons) than France or Italy (around 2.7–2.8 million
persons). The German regions are on average also smaller in territory than the French
or Italian ones. This observation carries some importance, as the share of people
leaving a smaller region is likely to be larger than the share of people leaving a larger
region given the same relative shock. The reason is that distance is likely to play a
role as a cost factor in the migration decision of individuals. When regions are
smaller, it will therefore be less costly to move to another region. As we cannot
control for these smaller distances within our framework, it should be borne in mind
that there is an a priori reason to believe that the estimated migration elasticities will
be somewhat higher for Western Germany than for France or Italy due to the smaller
size of the German regions.
Because the Hausman (1978) test rejected the random effects model in all cases, we
will only present fixed effects models in Section 3.3 below. As the fixed effects
estimator only uses the within variation in the panel data, it is important to observe
how much variation is lost by neglecting the between variation. Turning to the
dependent variable first, the within variation is about three times as large as the
between variation for Western Germany, but only around half as large for France and
Italy. Hence for the latter two countries, a lot of information is lost applying the fixed
effects estimator. For Western Germany, it should be kept in mind, though, that a
large share of the within variation is likely to be due to external migration. It is shown
that Western Germany (Table 4) has by far the highest mean migration–induced
population growth factor, followed by Italy (Table 6) and France (Table 5).
Turning to the exogenous variables, the within variation of the relative unemployment
rate is only a third or a half of the between variation. Again for Western Germany the
problem is less pronounced than for France and Italy. As concerns relative GDP, the
within variation is around a third (Western Germany), an eighth (France), or a
thirteenth (Italy) of the between variation. Hence for GDP the within variation is so
small that it would not be surprising to obtain insignificant coefficients on this
variable in a regression analysis using the fixed effects estimator. Only the variables
indicating the change in the unemployment rate and the change in GDP have a greater
within than between variation. These variables will be added to the regression as
exogenous variables. Summary statistics for the population, the absolute number of
11
the unemployed, the unemployment rate, and the level of GDP are reported to inform
the interested reader.
Before the presentation of the estimation results, we provide some descriptive
evidence on labour market outcomes in Euroland. Suppose that labour mobility were
sufficiently high in Europe to act as an adjustment mechanism between European
regions. Then we would expect that labour market outcomes such as unemployment
rates or GDP show some tendency of convergence over time. We therefore plot
coefficients of variation in unemployment rates as well as GDP (at purchasing power
parities) in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Turning to unemployment rates in Figure 6 first, the
coefficients of variation clearly change over time, yet these changes look cyclical
rather than outcomes of trends (cf. Baddeley, Martin, and Tyler, 1998). This is true
both for the coefficients of variation in the European Union and those for individual
nation states. Only reunited Germany has experienced some downward adjustment
after the shock of 1992. An interesting observation that can be made from Figure 6 is
that the dispersion in unemployment rates in Euroland is comparable to that of Italy
or reunited Germany at the time when unemployment soared in Eastern Germany. On
the other hand, Spain, a country with extremely high levels of unemployment has
nevertheless a dispersion in regional unemployment rates that is comparable to the
one of Western Germany, where unemployment has been comparatively low.
As to GDP (Figure 7), we also find that the dispersion amongst the regions of
Euroland is comparable to that of Italy. The dispersion in GDP within Western
Germany, France, or Spain is markedly lower than in Euroland or Italy. Considering
the coefficient of variation of Euroland in the early 1990s, it is shown that only
reunited Germany displays a greater regional variation in GDP. However, by the year
1995, the coefficients of variation of reunited Germany, Euroland, and Italy were not
very different from each other.
To sum up the descriptive evidence on the dispersion of unemployment rates and
GDP in Euroland over time, one can confidently conclude that no pronounced
convergence has occurred. This does not necessarily mean that labour mobility does
not work as a means of adjustment at all, as there might be large economic shocks
that just offset the equilibrating forces of the adjustment mechanism.
The following section will therefore estimate the migration elasticity with respect to
unemployment and GDP differentials for Western Germany, France, and Italy.
3.3 Estimation Results
The estimation results of the migration–induced population change are reported in
Table 2 below. The explanatory power is highest for Western Germany, followed by
12
Italy (1) (when total net migration is used), and France. However, the explanatory
power for the Italian (2) data on internal migration is the lowest of all equations. This
observation gives credence to the view that regional unemployment (and maybe
GDP) explains the direction of external migration better than the direction of internal
migration. Theoretical considerations are consistent with this result: an immigrant into
Italy will face similar transaction costs whether he or she moves to Milan or Naples.
Therefore, he or she will go where job opportunities are. For a person living in
Naples, it will make a difference whether he or she moves to Milan (positive
transaction costs) or stays where he or she lives (no transaction costs). It is therefore
plausible that external migrants react stronger to economic incentives within the
receiving country than people who already live in that country. This fact might also
explain why the explanatory power is highest for Western Germany, which saw a
huge immigration wave in the early 1990s.
As can be seen from Table 2, the only economic variable that is significant in all
regressions is the relative unemployment rate. The coefficients on relative GDP have
the expected sign, but are insignificant (the coefficients on the GDP variables are also
jointly insignificant in all equations). As the within variation of this variable is very
small, though, the insignificance of the coefficient is not very surprising. With the
data at hand, the effect of GDP may perhaps not be estimated with sufficient
precision. The point estimates of the coefficients can be interpreted the following
way: a ceteris paribus 1 percent rise in the GDP of a West German region leads to a
migration–induced population increase of 0.00136 percent in that region.
The interpretation of the coefficients on relative unemployment is similar: a ceteris
paribus 1 percent rise in the number of unemployed persons of a West German
region leads to a migration–induced population decrease of 0.00809 percent in that
region. To make the results more transparent, we have simulated the size of the
adjustment through migration in Table 3. To stay with the example of Western
Germany, a one percent increase of the number of unemployed persons from the
mean value in the sample amounts to 557 additional people in unemployment.
According to our estimates, the migration–induced population change of –0.00809
percent amounts to a net emigration of 165 people. Under the assumption that all of
the 165 emigrating people are unemployed and immediately find a job outside their
original region, migration would be able to adjust for 29.6 percent of the
unemployment shock within about 1.66 years (as unemployment is measured in April
of the previous year) after the shock. The corresponding figures for France and Italy
are much lower at 8.4 and 3.7 percent, respectively. When only internal migration is
considered in Italy, the estimate becomes even smaller, viz. 2.7 percent. It should be
stressed that these simulations make very strong assumptions by counting every
emigrant as an unemployed person who immediately finds a job outside his or her
home region. It is likely that some of the migrants are family members that are not
unemployed. And it may well be that some more time is needed until the emigrant
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finds a job elsewhere. Hence it follows that the simulated shares of the unemployment
shock which are adjusted by migration should be seen as upper bounds for the real
shares.
Although there are differences in methodology and data sources, our estimates are in
many points consistent with previous results in the literature (see Section 2 above).
Like Decressin and Fatás (1995), we find that mobility plays a greater role in Western
Germany than in Italy. Eichengreen (1993) also concludes that labour mobility is
comparatively low in Italy. Having estimated the accommodating potential of
migration to be 30 percent of an unemployment shock at a maximum in Western
Germany within 1.66 years after the shock, we conclude with other authors that
labour mobility can only be equilibrating in the medium to long run. From our
estimates, it would take at least four years in Western Germany until more than half of
a shock to unemployment is accommodated by migration. Moreover, it is likely that
the geographical location of the large number of external migrants into Western
Germany contributes heavily to the comparatively high migration elasticity in this
country. If this is the case, the internal migration elasticity might be much lower in
Western Germany. This is important, because immigrants to low unemployment
regions from outside Germany may even out unemployment differentials between
German regions, yet they do not necessarily lower the levels of unemployment in the
problem regions.
Therefore, the degree of labour mobility in Europe seems to be too low to act as a
mechanism to restore labour market equilibria between European regions in the short
run.
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Table 2: Estimation Results of Migration Equations
Western Germany France Italy (1) Italy (2)
Variable: Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. T
u ui t n t- -1 1/ –0.00809 –5.57 –0.00354 –2.06 –0.00152 –2.48 –0.00106 –2.87
( / ) ( / )u u u uit n t it n t- - - --1 1 2 2 –0.00332 –1.35 0.00159 0.75 –0.00017 –0.27 –0.00002 –0.06
y yi t n t- -1 1/ 0.00136 0.25 0.00857 1.50 0.00367 0.66 0.00367 1.00
( / ) ( / )y y y yit n t it n t- - - --1 1 2 2 0.00049 0.04 –0.00494 –0.80 –0.00163 –0.29 –0.00271 –0.78
Constant 0.00191 3.20 0.00207 2.80 –0.00009 –0.21 0.00002 0.08
Fixed time effects
Fixed region effects
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
(yes)
yes
N
T / T
N
R² within
30
11
330
0.8537
21
10
210
0.2208
20
11.95
239
0.5573
20
9.95
199
0.1222
Note: the region 'Corse' has been left out in the calculations for France due an inconsistency in the time
series of that region (information from Eurostat Luxembourg).
Source: Regio 98 databank, Eurostat; own calculations.
Table 3: Simulated Effects of 1 Percentage Increase in Number of Unemployed
Coeff. u a it -1 p o p i t -1 Change in
Unemployment
Migration–
Induced
Population
Change
Unempl.
Adjustment
due to Migr.
(%)
Western Germany –0.00809 55,710 2,035,418 557 –165 29.6
France –0.00354 111,981 2,664,092 1120 –94 8.4
Italy (1) –0.00152 115,995 2,849,854 1160 –43 3.7
Italy (2) –0.00106 114,180 2,850,224 1142 –30 2.7
Note: bars indicate means of variables; ua: number of persons unemployed in thousands; pop: population in
thousands; i: region indicator; t: time period (year) indicator; population is measured at the beginning of each
year; migration is measured in April of each year;
the region 'Corse' has been left out in the calculations for France due an inconsistency in the time series of
that region (information from Eurostat Luxembourg).
Source: Regio 98 databank, Eurostat; own calculations.
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4  Summary, Outlook, and Policy Options
Summary
We have estimated the share of an unemployment increase which is compensated
through migration within the first 1.66 years after the shock using the most recent
available data for Western Germany, France, and Italy. It turned out that in Western
Germany, this share is at a maximum 30 percent. For France and Italy, the figures are
only 8 and 4 percent, respectively. Our own estimates as well as previous estimates
of other authors suggest that the size of the migratory response to unemployment
differentials is so low that it takes several years, if not more than a decade for the
regional unemployment inequalities to be evened out by labour mobility. One can
thus safely conclude that labour mobility is not an economically significant
adjustment mechanism in Europe in the short run. This is true within nation states, but
all the more between them. As a consequence, Euroland has to live with larger and
more persistent structural problems than the United States, where labour is more
mobile.
Outlook
In theory this need not be a problem for the euro at all. First, it is not clear that the
loss of the exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism will on average lead to a
greater need for adjustment between European nation states: although there is some
weak evidence that independent monetary policies facilitated convergence, it also
seems that excessive exchange rate volatility was harmful in the past. Moreover, given
that inflation rates are now equal in the euro zone, asymmetric wage–push shocks are
likely to subside (Boockmann, 1999; Lauer, 1999). Second, regional inequalities in
Euroland are not per se a problem for a common currency. However, it can for the
moment be taken for granted that Europeans will at least in the medium run keep up
comparatively high welfare payments as well as regional policies. In such a setting,
the euro may increase the demand for public funds on a national, but maybe also on
a European level (cf. Büttner, 1999b). The consequences of monetary union
combined with deficient migration might therefore be higher taxes. Clearly, higher
taxes provide disincentives to economic activity and can have negative effects in
terms of economic welfare and growth.
The 1990s have shown that mobility, when it occurs to a significant extent, may
actually not be wanted. When largely British, Irish, and Portuguese building workers
competed successfully on the German labour market, the German authorities enacted
a law which forces foreign workers working for foreign companies in Germany to be
bound to the minimum wages that are agreed by German employers and unions
through collective bargaining (Posted Workers Law (Entsendegesetz), see Eekhoff,
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1996; Koberski, Stahl, and Hold, 1997). The spirit of that law shows that free
mobility of labour within the EU is not taken seriously. In the long run such policies
by nation states are likely to increase the strains of monetary union, not lessen them.
Policy Options
There are indeed many things that could still be done to increase labour mobility in
Europe. Here we identify four key points that we believe to be most effective (see
also the Green Book by the European Commission, 1996). First, the harmonisation
of professional degrees may be furthered. Second, tax systems can be harmonised.
Third, one could better co–ordinate the social insurance system. At the moment, it is
not possible to transfer rights to pensions and unemployment benefits without cost.
A factor increasing the mobility of the unemployed would be to condition
unemployment benefit entitlement on the readiness to accept a job in the entire EU,
not just in the particular nation state the unemployed person is a citizen of. Fourth, a
common language that is spoken and understood by all Europeans is essential for a
large number of workers to move between nation states. All workers in the EU would
therefore have to be fluent in one common language.
Clearly, if the four points just mentioned were implemented it would mean substantial
changes to European societies. The changes would not only be economic but affect
the society and culture in Europe's nation states profoundly. At the moment, issues
like a common official language are not on the political agenda. Although knowledge
of English is most often required in highly qualified jobs in Europe as well as in the
rest of the world, the proposal to make English (or any other language) the official
EU language will probably not find a majority in the near future. The harmonisation of
the social security system also seems to be distant. Nevertheless, there can be no
doubt that a significant increase in labour mobility requires such profound policy
measures.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Map of Euroland's NUTS2 Regions
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Figure 2: Migration–Induced Population Growth Factors – Western Germany
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Figure 3: Migration–Induced Population Growth Factors – France
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the region 'Corse' has been left out in the calculations for France due an inconsistency in the time series of
that region (information from Eurostat Luxembourg).
Source: Regio 98 databank, Eurostat; own calculations.
Figure 4: Migration–Induced Population Growth Factors – Italy (1)
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Figure 5: Internal Migration–Induced Population Growth Factors – Italy (2)
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Figure 6: Coefficients of Variation in Unemployment Rates
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Figure 7: Coefficients of Variation in GDP in Purchasing Power Parities
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Table 4: Summary Statistics – Western Germany
Variable Data Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
overall 1.00813 0.00596 0.99591 1.02411 N 330
between 0.00189 1.00386 1.01108 n 30
m i g pop
p o p
it it
it
+
-
-
1
1
within 0.00566 0.99714 1.02476 T 11
u ui t n t- -1 1/ overall 0.88930 0.32273 0.35938 2.00000 N 330
between 0.27865 0.51396 1.57468 n 30
within 0.16990 0.43906 1.34528 T 11
overall 0.98571 0.11387 0.68239 1.44842 N 330
between 0.01505 0.95531 1.02036 n 30
( / )
/
y y
y y
it n t
it n t
- -
- -
-
1 1
2 2
within 0.11291 0.69570 1.41378 T 11
y yi t n t- -1 1/ overall 1.01690 0.21521 0.66190 1.82774 N 330
between 0.20695 0.73487 1.66236 n 30
within 0.06921 0.85763 1.18852 T 11
overall 1.01105 0.04998 0.95129 1.22018 N 330
between 0.00607 0.99528 1.02075 n 30
( / )
/
y y
y y
it n t
it n t
- -
- -
-
1 1
2 2
within 0.04962 0.95952 1.21048 T 11
p o p it -1 overall 2035.42 1117.69 467.60 5293.30 N 330
between 1132.94 481.96 5172.43 n 30
within 68.49 1854.26 2240.16 T 11
u a it - 1 overall 55.71 38.18 7.70 212.10 N 330
between 36.92 11.63 181.73 n 30
within 11.68 9.78 99.81 T 11
u i t -1 overall 5.90 2.15 2.10 12.70 N 330
between 1.80 3.51 10.32 n 30
within 1.23 2.78 8.80 T 11
y i t -1 overall 16056.00 4511.49 8059.60 33620.90 N 330
between 3272.33 11620.86 26240.48 n 30
within 3157.68 7944.94 23436.41 T 11
Notes: the between data are formed by calculating the means over time by region xi. ; the within data are
defined as x x xit i- +. , where the overall mean x  is added to equate the mean of all data (overall,
between, and within);
abbreviations: mig: migration in thousands; pop: population in thousands; u: unemployment rate;
y: nominal GDP at purchasing power parities; ua: number of persons unemployed in thousands; i: region
indicator; n: country indicator; t: time period (year) indicator; N: total number of observations; n: number of
regions; T: number of time periods (years);
migration is net migration (total immigration – total emigration);
population is measured at the beginning of each year; migration is measured in April of each year.
Source: Regio 98 databank, Eurostat; own calculations.
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Table 5: Summary Statistics – France
Variable Data Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
overall 1.00091 0.00390 0.99142 1.01170 N 210
between 0.00372 0.99436 1.00971 n 21
m i g pop
p o p
it it
it
+
-
-
1
1
within 0.00141 0.99678 1.00546 T 10
u ui t n t- -1 1/ overall 1.02848 0.18466 0.53333 1.58000 N 210
between 0.17798 0.63833 1.40423 n 21
within 0.06152 0.87835 1.20425 T 10
overall 0.99814 0.05091 0.86022 1.16069 N 210
between 0.01003 0.97990 1.01240 n 21
( / )
/
y y
y y
it n t
it n t
- -
- -
-
1 1
2 2
within 0.04996 0.86801 1.14739 T 10
y yi t n t- -1 1/ overall 0.90908 0.14911 0.76234 1.54741 N 210
between 0.15129 0.78164 1.50104 n 21
within 0.01823 0.83645 0.97544 T 10
overall 0.99954 0.01814 0.94731 1.07124 N 210
between 0.00345 0.99177 1.00713 n 21
( / )
/
y y
y y
it n t
it n t
- -
- -
-
1 1
2 2
within 0.01782 0.94583 1.06976 T 10
p o p it -1 overall 2664.09 2076.84 718.90 10965.10 N 210
between 2121.76 726.93 10533.64 n 21
within 72.52 2301.85 3095.55 T 10
u a it - 1 overall 111.98 85.16 22.90 557.70 N 210
between 85.27 25.27 412.36 n 21
within 17.13 56.82 257.32 T 10
u i t -1 overall 10.11 2.02 4.80 16.00 N 210
between 1.74 6.30 13.77 n 21
within 1.09 8.23 13.98 T 10
y i t -1 overall 13249.76 3071.42 8817.30 27646.90 N 210
between 2215.49 11409.33 21933.05 n 21
within 2176.37 7552.31 18963.61 T 10
Notes: the between data are formed by calculating the means over time by region xi. ; the within data are
defined as x x xit i- +. , where the overall mean x  is added to equate the mean of all data (overall,
between, and within);
abbreviations: mig: migration in thousands; pop: population in thousands; u: unemployment rate;
y: nominal GDP at purchasing power parities; ua: number of persons unemployed in thousands; i: region
indicator; n: country indicator; t: time period (year) indicator; N: total number of observations; n: number of
regions; T: number of time periods (years);
migration is net migration (total immigration – total emigration); population is measured at the beginning of
each year; migration is measured in April of each year; the region 'Corse' has been left out in the
calculations for France due an inconsistency in the time series of that region (information from Eurostat
Luxembourg).
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Source: Regio 98 databank, Eurostat; own calculations.
Table 6: Summary Statistics – Italy (1)
Variable Data Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
overall 1.00143 0.00345 0.99236 1.01250 N 239
between 0.00300 0.99527 1.00741 n 20
m i g pop
p o p
it it
it
+
-
-
1
1
within 0.00185 0.99756 1.01145 T 11.95
u ui t n t- -1 1/ overall 1.02429 0.53488 0.23333 2.32000 N 239
between 0.52104 0.40433 1.92286 n 20
within 0.16622 0.37943 1.50107 T 11.95
overall 1.00536 0.17100 0.54688 2.02128 N 239
between 0.02861 0.96783 1.07113 n 20
( / )
/
y y
y y
it n t
it n t
- -
- -
-
1 1
2 2
within 0.16869 0.48111 1.97618 T 11.95
y yi t n t- -1 1/ overall 0.97204 0.23557 0.56052 1.32365 N 239
between 0.24082 0.58439 1.29620 n 20
within 0.01839 0.91365 1.04852 T 11.95
overall 1.00050 0.01890 0.93075 1.08787 N 239
between 0.00441 0.99367 1.01085 n 20
( / )
/
y y
y y
it n t
it n t
- -
- -
-
1 1
2 2
within 0.01840 0.92841 1.08552 T 11.95
p o p it -1 overall 2849.85 2219.55 112.50 8910.50 N 239
between 2274.71 114.95 8853.28 n 20
within 28.75 2755.15 2986.75 T 11.95
u a it - 1 overall 115.99 106.76 1.00 523.90 N 239
between 105.79 2.15 403.46 n 20
within 27.05 7.14 236.44 T 11.95
u i t -1 overall 10.29 5.47 2.10 25.60 N 239
between 5.23 4.12 19.29 n 20
within 1.99 3.30 16.76 T 11.95
y i t -1 overall 13708.86 4245.53 5802.90 22975.30 N 239
between 3433.26 8214.53 18512.46 n 20
within 2613.25 8168.89 19252.76 T 11.95
Notes: the between data are formed by calculating the means over time by region xi. ; the within data are
defined as x x xit i- +. , where the overall mean x  is added to equate the mean of all data (overall,
between, and within);
abbreviations: mig: migration in thousands; pop: population in thousands; u: unemployment rate;
y: nominal GDP at purchasing power parities; ua: number of persons unemployed in thousands; i: region
indicator; n: country indicator; t: time period (year) indicator; N: total number of observations; n: number of
regions; T : average number of time periods (years);
migration is net migration (total immigration – total emigration);
population is measured at the beginning of each year; migration is measured in April of each year.
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Source: Regio 98 databank, Eurostat; own calculations.
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Table 7: Summary Statistics – Italy (2)
Variable Data Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
overall 1.00021 0.00209 0.99375 1.00627 N 199
between 0.00202 0.99614 1.00442 n 20
m i g pop
p o p
it it
it
+
-
-
1
1
within 0.00074 0.99782 1.00231 T 9.95
u ui t n t- -1 1/ overall 1.02216 0.52088 0.23333 2.23333 N 199
between 0.50434 0.39892 1.87628 n 20
within 0.17084 0.39825 1.51989 T 9.95
overall 1.01020 0.18176 0.54688 2.02128 N 199
between 0.02665 0.97383 1.08335 n 20
( / )
/
y y
y y
it n t
it n t
- -
- -
-
1 1
2 2
within 0.17988 0.47373 1.97743 T 9.95
y yi t n t- -1 1/ overall 0.97136 0.23362 0.56052 1.31623 N 199
between 0.23890 0.58408 1.29377 n 20
within 0.01707 0.92302 1.03211 T 9.95
overall 1.00065 0.01934 0.93075 1.08787 N 199
between 0.00478 0.98963 1.00787 n 20
( / )
/
y y
y y
it n t
it n t
- -
- -
-
1 1
2 2
within 0.01877 0.92723 1.08435 T 9.95
p o p it -1 overall 2850.22 2217.99 112.50 8901.00 N 199
between 2272.69 114.69 8850.01 n 20
within 26.30 2767.55 2962.05 T 9.95
u a it - 1 overall 114.18 103.22 1.00 523.90 N 199
between 102.29 2.06 388.23 n 20
within 26.03 20.55 249.85 T 9.95
u i t -1 overall 10.08 5.19 2.10 23.00 N 199
between 4.95 3.98 18.46 n 20
within 1.90 3.60 16.40 T 9.95
y i t -1 overall 13353.82 4130.39 5802.90 21947.50 N 199
between 3322.41 8000.08 18108.96 n 20
within 2565.42 8312.80 18261.47 T 9.95
Notes: the between data are formed by calculating the means over time by region xi. ; the within data are
defined as x x xit i- +. , where the overall mean x  is added to equate the mean of all data (overall,
between, and within);
abbreviations: mig: migration in thousands; pop: population in thousands; u: unemployment rate;
y: nominal GDP at purchasing power parities; ua: number of persons unemployed in thousands; i: region
indicator; n: country indicator; t: time period (year) indicator; N: total number of observations; n: number of
regions; T : average number of time periods (years);
migration is net internal migration (total immigration from other Italian regions – total emigration to other
Italian regions);
population is measured at the beginning of each year; migration is measured in April of each year.
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Source: Regio 98 databank, Eurostat; own calculations.
